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Abstract
This article examines Buddhist extremism in Myanmar. It argues that Buddhist extremism—like
other types of religious extremism—is an acute form of fundamentalism. The article begins with
a survey of how extremism is usually understood in the theoretical literature, showing that its
religious variant is best conceived of as an acute form of fundamentalism. It then fine tunes this
understanding, arguing that religious extremism is a fundamentalist belief system that justifies
structural violence against relevant out-groups. The article outlines seven core characteristics of
the religious extremist culled from the various theoretical approaches to extremism. It employs
these seven characteristics to examine Buddhist extremism in Myanmar, particularly in the way
it has fueled violence against the ethnic minority Rohingya Muslim community in that country,
giving rise to a humanitarian crisis with potential wider regional repercussions. The article
reiterates that to cope with the ongoing Rohingya crisis, policy makers within and outside
Myanmar must acquire a much deeper understanding of Buddhist extremism.
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Most observers studying violent extremism in Southeast Asia focus on Islamist expressions of
the phenomenon, with good reason. The region has long been home to numerous militant groups
animated by various violent forms of the political ideology of Islamism. These violent Islamist
militant and insurgent networks have spanned the spectrum from transnational networks—such
as the Indonesian-epicentered, Al Qaeda–linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and its various splinters
that date from the first decade of the twenty-first century, the JI-affiliated Kumpulan Militan
Malaysia, and the Al Qaeda–linked and more recent Islamic State–linked Abu Sayyaf Group and
other factions in the southern Philippines—to more nationally focused Islamist groups—such as
the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao and the
Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate and similar groups in the long-running insurgency in
southern Thailand.1 It is important to recognize, however, that extremism can infect all faiths not
just in this region but elsewhere. In this respect, the controversial monk Ashin Wirathu, a
nationally known leader of the Buddhist fundamentalist 969 and its successor, the Ma Ba Tha
movement in Myanmar, and his fellow monks associated with this movement provide a useful
reminder of how religious extremism beyond the Islamist variety exists in Southeast Asia.
Wirathu and his associates have long been associated with sectarian violence against the Muslim
Rohingya and other Muslim minorities in the country.2
The 969 movement arose in the southern city of Mawlamyine in 2011. According to the
International Crisis Group, “969 is numerological shorthand for the special attributes of Buddha
and his teachings and a riposte to the number ‘786,’” which is a “folk Islam representation of the
Basmala long used by Muslims in Myanmar and elsewhere to identify halal restaurants and
Muslim-owned shops.”3 When 969 ran afoul of the authorities after it was accused of fueling
Buddhist-Muslim violence and faded from the scene, Ma Ba Tha—the Association for the
Protection of Race and Religion—emerged in earnest by early 2014 to take its place.4 Wirathu,
in his role as a central figure in 969 and Ma Ba Thah, has graced the cover of Time magazine and
has even been called the “Burmese bin Laden” because his sermons have been blamed for
fueling the anti-Muslim violence that has rocked Myanmar in recent years.5 Wirathu, who began
preaching in 2001 against the threat of Islam, was arrested in 2003 and sentenced to twenty-five
years in jail for dangerous speech in the form of inflammatory anti-Muslim pamphlets. These
materials had apparently incited deadly violence in Kyaukse, his hometown. He was freed in
2011 as part of a government amnesty.6 Between June and October 2012, 200 people, mainly
Muslims, were killed in Buddhist-Muslim riots in the western Arakan region of Myanmar, and
110,000 villagers, mostly Muslim Rohingya, were displaced. While Wirathu’s role in fomenting
Buddhist-Muslim tensions should not be overplayed—as mentioned and as we shall see, there
have been other extremists as well—he seems to have skillfully tapped into widespread Buddhist
anxieties about Muslims, who form only about 4 percent of the total population, which is
dominated by the Buddhists (88 percent). In general, Myanmar’s Muslims—except for the
disenfranchised Rohingya in Arakan—are economically well off. Ordinary Buddhists, influenced
by the incendiary sermons of Wirathu and his like, fear that Islam—not Buddhism—will
eventually dominate the country.7
Before we examine how Wirathu and his colleagues evinced extremist tendencies, we shall
survey how extremism is usually understood in the theoretical literature, showing that its
religious variant is best conceived of as an acute form of fundamentalism. In the process, we
shall define religious extremism as a fundamentalist belief system that justifies structural
violence against relevant out-groups. Next, we shall outline seven core characteristics of the
religious extremist, culled from a close reading of the various theoretical approaches to the
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subject. Finally, we shall apply these seven characteristics to better grasp how Buddhist
extremism in Myanmar presents itself.

What Is Extremism?
Some scholars posit that being extremist in one’s views does not necessarily mean being violent
and that “extreme movements are good, even great . . . when people shift from indifference to
intense concern with local problems, such as poverty and crime.”8 Other analysts opine that
“extremism is not necessarily bad or good” and can be “employed in the service of goals that
may be valued either positively or negatively by a given individual or group.”9 Alex Schmid has
argued, however, that governments should counter extremism in all its ideological forms and
should do so whether it is violent or not. According to the literature, there are still other ways of
thinking about extremism. It has been suggested, for example, that the extremist “state of mind
tolerates no diversity” and internalizes an “ideology” delineating “a simplified monocausal
interpretation of the world where you are either with them or against them.”10 Also, extremism is
said to refer to an intense emotional attachment to that particular worldview. Kristen Klein and
Arie Kruglanski argue that it means “zeal or profound conviction” for “a particular position or
attitude on a given issue.” 11 This notion of zeal or profound conviction for a particular
worldview corresponds neatly with what Max Taylor has called “fanaticism” or “excessive
enthusiasm” for the worldview in question, arising from a single-minded focus on ideological
convictions—one that is resistant to “other social, political or personal forces that might be
expected to control and influence behaviour.”12 Further, extremism can imply that the zealous
adherents to the narrow worldview consider it to be dominant over other contending
interpretations. Hence, extremism “takes its own wider group identity—be it religion or
tradition—to an extreme; not by a move away from the centre, but rather by intensifying its selfunderstanding and self-proclamation as representing, or being, the centre.”13
Another interpretation of extremism is its implicit embrace of violence as a possible tactic to
actualize its preferred worldview. Schmid avers that extremists are “positively in favor of the use
of force to obtain and maintain political power,” despite being “vague and ambiguous in their
public pronouncements,” particularly “when they are in a position of weakness.”14 In the same
vein, J. M. Berger posits that extremism “refers to the belief that an in-group’s success or
survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group,” including
“violence, and even genocide.”15 Other scholars suggest that extremism also connotes that the
narrow worldview in question resides at the margins and boundaries of the societal mainstream
and tends to be only tenuously linked to the normative core or center.16 In this sense, extremism
represents a stark deviation from the societal norm or the majority worldview.17 In other words,
extremism refers to “actions and value systems”—or worldviews—“that lie beyond the moral
and political centre of society.”18 To reiterate the point, worldviews are extremist if they are far
removed from the societal norm. It is worth noting here that because there are different societies
in the world, there could be differing societal norms. Hence, as Jane Kinninmont notes, the term
extremism can be interpreted differently in different national contexts. While the United
Kingdom and the Gulf countries, for example, differ on whether promoting atheist beliefs and
LGBT and abortion rights should be considered “extremist,” the United Arab Emirates and
Qatar—both Gulf countries—disagree about whether the Muslim Brotherhood should be seen as
an extremist entity.19 Thus, extremism may be context specific. What is considered extremist in a
secular, multicultural country with a unique political and historical trajectory may not be seen as
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such in a country with a more religiously legitimized and racially homogeneous country with an
entirely different political and historical heritage.20
In keeping with the foregoing analysis, religious extremism is defined in this study as a
fundamentalist belief system that legitimizes the structural violence of an in-group against
relevant out-groups. Two points are worth making here by way of elaboration. First, religious
extremism is an acute form of fundamentalism—religion on the defensive. Fundamentalism, in
other words, is “a discernible pattern of religious militance by which self-styled ‘true believers’
attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community,
and create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors.”21 Broadly agreeing, Malise
Ruthven describes fundamentalism as a “religious way of being that manifests itself in a strategy
by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identities as individuals or
groups in the face of modernity and secularization.”22 The fundamentalist response is generated
in the face of not just the “general processes” of secularization and modernization and a “secular
state” aiming to “secularize and delimit the domain of the sacred” but also—and importantly for
our purposes—“other religions and/or ethnic groups.”23 In sum, the “defense of religion is the
sine qua non of fundamentalism; without it, a movement may not properly be labelled
fundamentalist.”24
Second, extremism could be seen as a belief system that legitimizes structural violence
against relevant out-groups. Berger, in his interpretation of extremism as “hostile action” against
out-groups, argues that while physical “violence” is part of the hostile action he mentions, it is
not the only form. He adds that such hostile action includes “verbal attacks and diminishment to
discriminatory behavior.”25 We can go further to more systematically situate his musings about
not-violent yet hostile out-group actions as forms of structural violence. Structural violence has
long been understood to encompass more than mere physical violence. In 1969, Johan Galtung,
the doyen of peace and conflict studies, interpreted violence broadly. In a famous and wideranging essay, he argues that, in essence, “violence is present when human beings are being
influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential
realizations.”26 Applying Galtung’s analysis of violence here, it could be said that out-group
members experience violence not just when they are subjected to direct physical attacks—
“personal violence”—but also when they are subjected to the indirect, sustained psychological
threat of such attacks—“psychological violence.”27 Moreover, apart from “violence that works
on the body,” there is also “violence that works on the soul; where the latter would include lies,
brainwashing, indoctrination of various kinds, threats, etc. that serve to decrease mental
potentialities.” 28 In addition, there need not be any observable “subject” or perpetrator
administering violence on the “objects” or out-group members. The political system itself that is
dominated by powerful in-groups could ensure that “violence is built into the structure and
shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.” In other words, when
resources are “unevenly distributed, as when income distributions are heavily skewed,
literacy/education unevenly distributed, medical services existent in some districts and for some
groups only, and so on”; when “all the power to decide over the distribution of resources is
unevenly distributed”; and when “the persons low on income are also low in education, low on
health, and low on power—as is frequently the case because these rank dimensions tend to be
heavily correlated due to the way they are tied together in the social structure”—we are talking
about broader, more insidious structural violence.29
Two final elements of Galtung’s perceptive analysis are relevant here. First, personal, outgroup physical violence is often subtle and “latent.” That is, “latent violence is something which
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is not there, yet might easily come about”; it refers to “a situation where a little challenge would
trigger considerable killing and atrocity” and exists “the day, hour, minute, second before the
first bomb, shot, fist-fight, cry.”30 Second, policy makers, rather than expending energy in
determining guilt by focusing on whether out-group violence by certain perpetrators was
intended or unintended, should analyze what the potential consequences of their actions would
have been. As Galtung says, “ethical systems directed against intended violence will easily fail to
capture structural violence in their nets—and may hence be catching the small fry and letting the
big fish loose.”31 Galtung’s insights on latency and consequence are important. They offer us the
opportunity to shift from an excessive downstream, analytical focus on only the violent
manifestations of religious extremism to a much-needed, more upstream excavation of the subtle
dangers of the supposedly “nonviolent” expressions of extremism itself. Specifically, Galtung’s
musings on latency and consequence enable us to move away from the “small fry”—the actual
violent perpetrators themselves, be they rioters, lone actors, or networked terrorists—to grasp the
structural impact of the ostensibly “nonviolent” ideological extremist entrepreneurs in the
background—“the big fish” whose hateful, carefully calibrated rhetorical remonstrations online
or in the real world have been a source of continuing controversy. We shall now address this
issue as part of a discussion of seven core characteristics of the religious extremist.

Core Characteristics of the Religious Extremist
As discussed, religious extremism is best seen as an acute form of fundamentalism. Put another
way, extremism is a gestalt—or what David M. Terman defines as a “perceptual, affectivecognitive” structure.32 I contend that within the wider context of a religious in-group perceiving
itself to be facing varying degrees and combinations of political, social, or economic pressures
within a multicultural polity, the religious extremist—in contrast to mainstream believers within
in-group ranks—evinces seven core characteristics.
The first, and foremost, core characteristic of the religious extremist is the intense
emotional, fanatical attachment he displays toward his sectarian religious belief system, in the
process relegating universally recognized international customs, as well as mainstream national
constitutional, ideological, or mainline theological currents, to a secondary status. In other
words, while the “actions and value systems” of the religious extremist “lie beyond the moral
and political centre of society,”33 he takes his “own wider group identity” to “an extreme” by
“intensifying its self-understanding and self-proclamation as representing, or being, the centre.”34
The religious extremist is thus an identity supremacist, particularly strongly driven by the
“pecking order impulse” for in-group “pride, dignity and dominance.”35 The uncompromising
zeal of the religious extremist to promote and preserve the pecking-order primacy of his religious
belief system and way of life with respect to universal international customs, mainstream
national ideological, or theological worldviews illustrates an “obsessive-compulsive flavor”
grounded in a “rigid structuralist approach.”36 Thus, the extremist comes across as closedminded, rigidly certain in his convictions and resistant to countervailing facts, and uninterested
in relation to debate and compromise.37 The extremist’s drive for pecking-order primacy for his
religious way of life is further fueled by a perceived sense of victimization by dominant outgroups. The British Islamist extremist Anjem Choudary, for example, has charged that
mainstream society disadvantages and discriminates against Muslims.38
Another good example of the identity supremacism described here is that evinced by Jewish
extremist right-wing settlers in Israel’s West Bank. The “most hard-core settlers,” Jeffrey
Goldberg writes, “profess indifference, even scorn, for the state”; they are “free of doubt” and
5
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see “themselves taking orders from God,” not the state. 39 As Neil Kressel notes, while
mainstream Israelis wish to be governed under secular, humanitarian, and liberal principles,
seeing themselves “as more Israelis than Jews,” the so-called retros—the settlers—regard “Israel
as inherently different from other nations and separate; they see themselves more as Jews than as
Israelis.”40 In short, the religious extremist’s acute fundamentalist fixation with championing ingroup identity and prestige compels him to deprioritize potentially competing identities—
whether these are mainstream religious currents or national constitutional, ideological identities.
This supremacist attitudinal orientation becomes problematic in secular multicultural contexts.
Francis Fukuyama has argued that stable modern multicultural democracies cannot be based on
any single “race, ethnicity, and religion” but must instead be based on shared creedal
understandings, such as constitutionalism, democratic accountability, the rule of law, and
political equality.41 In a similar vein, Amy Chua argues that an overarching US national identity
cannot be based on sectarian understandings such as “‘whiteness,’ ‘Anglo-Protestant culture,’
‘European Christianity,’ or any other terms not inclusive of all religions and ethnicities.”42
Hence, championing a sectarian religious belief system and way of life at the expense of
mainstream theological or national constitutional ideals within a secular democratic multicultural
context would be an extremist act.
A second core characteristic of the religious extremist flows from this intrinsic identity
supremacism: he is dogmatically committed to the notion that his religious in-group is inherently
morally superior to relevant out-groups. Generally, cognitive neuroscientists tell us that “it is
easier for the brain to first quantify objects into pairs, and then to differentiate them into
opposing groups,” such as “Republican or Democrat”; furthermore, these “dyads” represent a
“unified concept” because “each term is defined according to its relationship to the other.” Thus,
once an “oppositional dyad” is generated, the brain will automatically impose an “emotional bias
on each part of the dyad,” leading us, after we “divide objects, people, and ideals into groups,” to
“express a preference for one and a dislike for the other.”43 E. O. Wilson concurs, noting that the
root of this in-group bias is the basic human yearning to belong to “any collectivity that can be
compared favorably with other, competing groups of the same category,” such as a “religious
sect.”44 Hence, going from “categorization to stereotyping and favoritism for one’s own group,”
Neil Kressel asserts, “is not that difficult.”45 Furthermore, religious in-group members generally
believe that co-religionists are “more similar” to themselves than to “out-group members” across
a “wide range of thoughts, feelings and behaviors,”46 and the in-group as a whole basically
possesses a good, morally pure “essence”—“the unseen spirit or nature that is endangered by
contact or infection.”47 The point is, such a generalized cognitive-affective tendency toward ingroup bias, while present among mainstream believers, is far more acutely pronounced in the
case of the religious extremist. Clark McCauley and Daniel Chirot observe in this respect that the
acute, zealous in-group “love” of the religious extremist predisposes him to go through
extraordinary lengths to protect the “in-group’s essence” against contamination by ostensibly
impure out-group essences.48
This brings us to the third, related core characteristic of the religious extremist: he is equally
dogmatically committed to the notion that the out-group as a whole is evil and poses an urgent,
existential threat to the in-group. For mainstream in-group members, the “out-group
homogeneity effect” predisposes them to assume that all out-group members are basically alike
and “if we know something about one out-group member” we “feel that we know something
about all of them.”49 Because of the “accentuation effect,” mainstream in-group members to
varying degrees tend to be biased toward information that amplifies the differences with out-
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group members. Intergroup similarities tend to be downplayed or ignored.50 Within a wider
religious in-group facing serious stresses within a multicultural polity, mainstream believers may
well be experiencing various degrees of mass radicalization: the cognitive processes of in-group
depluralization, in which all other competing in-group identities are stripped away; selfdeindividuation, in which in-group members’ personal identities are eliminated; and otherdeindividuation, in which the personal identities of out-group members are stripped away. These
processes, however, would be far more acute among in-group religious extremists.51
The deep-rooted fundamentalist impulse animating the religious extremist would compel
him to hold that nothing less than a battle of “good and evil” is involved, in which “two
incompatible essences” are engaged in cosmic conflict, and where “love of the good means
necessarily hate for the threatening out-group.” In short, the “out-group’s essence must be kept
from contaminating the in-group’s essence.”52 Moreover, the religious extremist would believe
that urgent action is needed to defend the in-group against the existential “crisis” perpetrated by
the out-group against the embattled in-group.53 Following Andrew Newberg and Mark Robert
Waldman, therefore, while gradually radicalizing mainstream religious in-group members may
“assign preferences and dislikes to people from different cultural, religious, and ethnic
backgrounds” and seek to “develop scenarios—pass laws, distribute benefits, etc.—that are less
than favorable for the out-group,”54 in-group extremists would be willing to go much further to
engage in distinctly stronger forms of such structural violence. Berger identifies a spectrum of
stronger structurally violent extremist responses, ranging from direct harassment, discrimination,
and enforced physical segregation to outright physical violence, such as hate crimes or
“nonsystematic violence against out-group members,” to “terrorism,” “genocide,” and “war.”55
A fourth core characteristic of the religious extremist is an obsession with purity and fear of
contamination of the good essence of the in-group through commingling with the out-group. To
better understand this characteristic, we can turn to the so-called four Bs of community life that
members of a religious in-group are expected to commit to: beliefs, behavior (or rituals), badges
(clothing or other markings), and bans (taboos and proscribed activity). Adhering to certain
beliefs and behavioral rituals, badges, and bans often require costly, sacrificial responses from
religious in-group members.56 In the context of the current discussion, it could be said that while
mainstream believers would likely evince nominal adherence to the four Bs, in-group extremists
would hold to these four Bs with much greater degrees of fealty and zeal, and, as acute
fundamentalists at the core, would seek to impose such commitment on the wider community of
less extreme co-religionists. An example of an extremist interpretation of the four Bs comes from
the United States: some violent Christian anti-abortion extremists influenced by Reconstruction
theology hold the belief that the country should become a “Christian theocratic state.”
Reconstructionists and other extremists, hewing to the related tenets of Dominion theology,
argue that the United States should function as a “Christian nation” rather than a “secular
society,” and in this respect, “abortion on demand, fornication, homosexuality,” and “sexual
entertainment” are regarded as bans.57 In the realm of behavior, another strain of Christian
extremism calls for social segregation from and religiously sanctioned violence against outgroups. Hence, adherents of Christian Identity seek to merge religion and the state in “a new
society governed by religious law,” compelling identity groups such as Elohim City, the Aryan
Nations Compound, and the Freeman Compound to “live together in theocratic societies” away
from the societal mainstream. Furthermore, driven by an “apocalyptic view of history,” they are
geared toward “valiant, militant efforts” to threaten the “evil system” of governance that is said
to be manipulated behind the scenes by a global “Jewish-Freemason conspiracy to control the
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world and deprive individuals of their freedom.” Identity extremists also carry firearms as a
badge of their religious commitment to defend their way of life against the trepidations of the
“Jewish-UN-liberal conspirators.”58 In sum, a fourth core characteristic of the religious extremist
can be said—through the instrumentality of the four Bs—to “enforce rigid boundaries between”
his ostensibly beleaguered in-group and hostile and threatening out-groups.59
A fifth core characteristic of the religious extremist is a pronounced categorical or dualistic
thinking. The cognitive exercise of simplifying and organizing the social environment into
binary oppositions is rooted in human nature and encompasses multiple domains, such as age,
culture, religion, ethnicity, language, social class, and sexual orientation.60 Furthermore, the
fundamentalist mindset animating religious extremists evinces this cognitive tendency more
strongly. The rigid, dualistic cognitive orientation of the religious extremist arises out of the
“psychological anxiety” caused by “perceived threat or uncertainty” to “simplify” and to
“eliminate the middle ground, to split, dividing the world into safe and threat, good and evil, life
and death.”61 Schmid thus considers religious extremists to be “single-minded black-or-white
thinkers.”62 A related factor intensifying the dualistic thinking of the religious extremist is what
has been called low integrative complexity as evinced in the fanatic’s “simplified view of the
world.” 63 While “integratively complex thinking recognizes the legitimacy of different
evaluative viewpoints and is capable of higher order synthesis of these viewpoints,” lower
integrative complexity “thinks in terms of, for example, binary, black-and white contrasts with
little or no integration of the perspectives.”64 While stronger integrative complexity is able to
“achieve higher levels of integration between non-compatible perspectives” through, for
example, “dialectical reasoning (thesis, antithesis, synthesis) and analogical reasoning (x is like
y, as in the metaphor ‘man is a wolf’),” the lower integrative complexity of the religious
extremist tends to result in information processing derived from “classical binary
logical/mathematical thinking.”65 In this respect, it is interesting that Khaled Abou El Fadl,
writing about the Islamic fundamentalist-extremist variant known as Wahhabism, observes that
“the majority” of the Wahhabi “puritan leadership” comprised people who “studied the physical
sciences, such as medicine, engineering, and computer science” and hence “anchor themselves in
the objectivity and certitude that comes from empiricism.” 66 Perhaps the binary
logical/mathematical thinking associated with some of the harder technical sciences fosters a
lower integrative complexity, rendering religious extremists from such educational backgrounds
prone to “monodimensional or literalist readings of scripture,” in contrast with their
“counterparts in the arts and humanities whose training”—and consequently stronger forms of
integrative complexity—“requires them to approach texts multidimensionally, exploring
contradictions and ambiguities.”67 Very few “poets and cosmologists,” Martin Marty and Scott
Appleby wryly observe, “find their way into fundamentalist cadres.”68
While a supposed link between an education in the physical/technical sciences and
fundamentalism/extremism has attracted scholarly attention, it should not be overdone.69 More
generally, the rigid, dualistic thinking and lower integrative complexity of the religious extremist
can also be incubated through sustained socialization within religious enclaves insulated from
the multicultural, societal mainstream, or what Cass Sunstein would describe as insulated social
spaces or enclaves.70 Hence, while the Christian Identity groups described earlier live together in
theocratic societies away from the societal mainstream, the Indonesian Islamist extremist and
long-time spiritual leader of the JI terrorist network, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, described as “a very
simple man” possessing a “horizon” that is “very primordial” and “very much ignorant in other
matters” beyond Islam, evolved his low integrative complexity through sustained immersion in
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almost exclusively Islamist, in particular, Darul Islam, circles. 71 Ba’asyir’s low integrative
complexity has predisposed him to see the world in rigid, dualistic, Manichean terms for sure.
His “maximalist” interpretation of Islam “is couched in terms of an oppositional dialectic that
juxtaposes Islam against everything else that is deemed un-Islamic or anti-Islamic [such as]
secularism, Western culture and values, democracy, worldly politics,” as well as other religions
and “all man-made secular ideologies.”72
The sixth core characteristic of the religious extremist is a tendency to engage in dangerous
speech toward out-group members. Dangerous speech, according to Susan Benesch, is “an act of
speech [that] has a reasonable chance of catalyzing or amplifying violence by one group against
another, given the circumstances in which it was made or disseminated.”73 Dangerous speech
occurs when several key elements are present: a charismatic extremist ideologue who possesses
significant influence over a particular audience, widespread grievances and anxieties that can be
exploited by that ideologue, a sociohistorical context of past intergroup conflict and weak rule of
law, lack of access to countervailing sources of information, and speech content that
dehumanizes the out-group “as vermin, pests, insects or animals” and actively justifies violence
against its members as legitimate self-defence.74 Benesch’s insights on dangerous, linguistically
dehumanizing speech are further strengthened by Paul Rozin’s work on the psychology of
disgust. Rozin argues that such a psychology is an evolved instinct in human beings. This
instinct emerged in ancestral environments in which early human bands not only had to guard
against predators and other warring tribes but also had to worry about the unseen bacteria and
germs infesting plant life and the bodies of dead animals. Gradually, a powerful, instinctive
psychological revulsion toward rotting food and corpses and dirt and excrement evolved as an
important evolutionary adaptation. Rozin argues that the human contagion-avoidance instinct has
so evolved that we automatically assume that “limited contact, however brief,” with a source of
dangerous contamination “transmits the whole of the risk.”75 The point is this: The unconscious,
evolved human contagion-avoidance instinct can also be activated when contamination-averse
religious extremists encounter out-group members stereotyped as unclean. This is not an
outlandish idea. John Teehan reminds us that in the Old Testament, for example, the Israelites
were commanded to destroy entire “sinful” cities and towns because they are “polluted and so
everything in [them] must go.”76
In other words, because linguistically dehumanizing speech against out-group members
activates the contagion-avoidance instinct that is pronounced among religious extremists, even
supposedly “nonviolent” rhetoric that while not directly inciting out-group violence nevertheless
compares religious out-group members to “pigs, rats, maggots, cockroaches, and other vermin”
becomes potentially dangerous. As argued, dehumanizing rhetoric establishes an unconscious
link between “disgust and genocide” among religious extremists, encouraging them to believe
that these “disgusting characteristics” of the out-group “threaten to pollute the environment and
must be eliminated.”77 In this respect, it could be said that when the Indonesian JI terrorist
Mukhlas—implicated in the October 2002 Bali nightclub bombings—referred to all Westerners
as “dirty animals and insects,”78 such speech was dangerous because it was what the former
radical Ed Husain calls “mood music.” Though mood music may not necessarily always incite
out-group violence directly and explicitly, by activating the contagion-avoidance instinct of ingroup extremists, it paves the way psychologically for such violence eventually to be
perpetrated.79 Anthony Stahelski concurs that “dehumanization,” in which out-group members
begin to be regarded as “subhuman” or “inhuman,” and finally “demonization,” in which they
are reframed as ‘“evil,” are cause for concern.80 Similarly, James W. Jones holds that when
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religious extremists subject out-group members to what he calls “satanization,” the latter would
be seen as subhumans “who embody pure evil,” who “cannot be argued with or compromised
with” and “can only be destroyed” as a “moral duty.”81 No one who lets religious extremists
preach “antidemocratic, antihuman sermons of hate in public,” Hamed Abdul-Samad warns, “has
the right to be surprised when, sooner or later, their messages lead to violence.”82
The dangerous speech of religious extremists thus can be of two types: “hard” or “soft.” In
the hard mode, the extremist makes little effort to temper his incitement to out-group violence.
But extremists may also operate in a more subtle, more difficult to detect soft mode, not
explicitly inciting violence, for fear of falling afoul of national laws against hate speech. In the
United Kingdom, for example, for years the Islamist extremist Anjem Choudary managed to
evade arrest by being “careful to avoid being linked to anything actually illegal,” expressing
public sympathy, defending and justifying the actions of terrorist plotters—but adding for good
measure that he was not directly involved with their plans.83 Ba’asyir in Indonesia provides an
example of operating in both modes. In October 2007, addressing a crowd of young people in
East Java, he incited them to “just beat up” foreigners who dared to venture into East Java and
“not tolerate them.”84 Though much of the time Ba’asyir avoided explicitly calling for out-group
violence, even his speech in the soft mode provided the sort of mood music that fosters a
combustible climate of out-group intolerance that could spark into violence should the right
circumstances coalesce. Hence, when he extolled Muslims in Indonesia to “reject the laws of the
nation’s parliament” because “following state laws” that contradicted “Islamic Shariah law” was
an “act of blasphemy” and when he dehumanized non-Muslim tourists in Bali by calling them
“worms, snakes, maggots,” that is, “animals that crawl,”85 and advised his followers not to “seek
to mingle” with such outsiders, his speech was problematic.86
Even in the absence of direct incitement to act violently, soft hate rhetoric such as that
Ba’asyir used can, with repetition, be as dangerous as hard hate rhetoric. By subtly normalizing
and mainstreaming “discriminatory, intimidating, disapproving, antagonistic, and/or prejudicial
attitudes towards” out-groups with a view “to injure, dehumanise, harass, intimidate, debase,
degrade and victimize” them, soft hate rhetoric eventually foments “insensitivity and brutality
against them.”87 Thus, Schmid has argued, the whole notion of “non-violent extremism” is
utterly “misleading.” While “Gandhian non-violence is radical” it is not “extreme, he writes, it is
an example of a “principled political philosophy that seeks to hold the moral high ground in the
face of a violent opponent.” By contrast, extremism is in essence “not-violent” or “not-now
violent” in the sense that “the non-use of violence is based merely on pragmatic, tactical and/or
temporal considerations.” 88 Astrid Botticher agrees, arguing that “holding extremist views
without the political will to translate thoughts into action might be more a question of
circumstances and opportunities than principles.”89 In short, the religious extremist can shift
between soft and hard modes of dangerous speech depending on his tactical appreciation of the
situation.
A seventh core characteristic of the religious extremist is his drive to seek the political clout
and influence to restructure the wider polity and society to reflect his preferred vision of a
religiously legitimated sociopolitical order, in which divinely sanctioned structural violence is
inflicted on enemy out-groups. Animated by an acute fundamentalist drive to defend their
religious in-group from an ostensibly threatening sociopolitical environment of competing outgroups, extremists “would like everyone to be like them, preferably under theocratic rule.”90
Stuart Sim points out, for example, that the acutely fundamentalist extremist, as seen evincing
low integrative complexity and consequently driven by the “desire for certainty,” seeks also “the
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power to enforce that certainty on others.”91 Thus, Sim adds, “power is a political rather than a
spiritual issue,” and what sets the extremist apart from politically active co-believers is a far
more pronounced quest for “control, control, control.”92 This fixation with seeking power and
control explains why the religious extremist, as Schmid notes, is “anti-constitutional, antidemocratic, anti-pluralist, authoritarian,” “fanatical, intolerant,” “rejecting the rule of law while
adhering to an ends-justify-means philosophy,” and, of no small consequence, aiming to realize
his “goals by any means, including, when the opportunity offers itself, the use of massive
political violence against opponents.”93 The extremist drive for power and control is evinced by
the Christian extremist network Army of God, for example, which considers US society to be in
a state of moral and spiritual decay and has sought power to construct “a new moral order” based
on “Biblical” and not “secular principles.” Moreover, evincing the always-present potential for
out-group physical violence as Schmid indicates, Army of God followers admitted that because
“America was on the edge of an abyss,” it was apparent that “civil war was inevitable.”94

The Framework Applied: Core Characteristics of Buddhist Extremism in
Myanmar
Returning to the case of Buddhist extremism in Myanmar, what can we surmise? Above all,
Wirathu himself is unequivocally an identity supremacist, though to be fair, this orientation
could be said to be partly a product of the wider historical evolution of Buddhist-majority but
multicultural Myanmar itself. Until the reign of King Anawratha in the eleventh century CE, the
country hosted several religions, including Hinduism, Theravada Buddhism, and animism.
Anawratha, however, began institutionalizing Buddhism as the de facto state religion of his
empire, establishing a special, mutually symbiotic politico-religious relationship with the Sangha
monastic order. Nevertheless, Anawratha’s successors did not engage in systematic structural
depredations against other faiths—such as Islam—that had emerged in the country by the ninth
century, having been introduced by seafaring traders from India and Persia. Instead, as Francis
Wade points out, they cultivated “a degree of communal harmony that would be unfamiliar to
those watching the country today.” In fact, he adds, the “country had on the whole enjoyed a
pluralistic society.”95 But in the wake of political missteps by the British, beginning in the late
nineteenth century, Muslims and other minorities were increasingly viewed as colonial stooges
out to undermine the political dominance of the Buddhist Bamar (Burman) majority. A
nationalist anticolonial movement gathered steam by the 1930s, fired by “an ethnic and religious
chauvinism” toward “non-Bamar and non-Buddhist” minorities that “would carry well into the
post-independence era, splitting the country along multiple lines and paving the way for decades
of conflict.”96 After independence, moreover, attempts by the postcolonial military regime to
designate Buddhism as the state religion were rebuffed by minority groups.
By 2008, the national constitution, while recognizing the “special position of Buddhism as
the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens (section 361),” also took care to stipulate
under section 362 that “Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Animism” have followers in the
country as well.97 By October 2017, the newly elected National League for Democracy civilian
government had ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
which includes a provision that states are obliged to “guarantee economic and social rights
without distinction as to race, religion, or national or social origin.”98 Nevertheless, a widespread
notion long before had taken root in military-institutional circles that while building a strong
Myanmar based on the “purity and homogeneity” of the Buddhist-Bamar majority community
was utterly imperative,99 the country was being “‘lost’ to Muslims” who identify as ethnic
11

New England Journal of Public Policy
“Rohingya.” They are descendants of early Muslim settlers who came from Bengal between the
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, from the laborers brought in by the British during the colonial
era of the twentieth century, and later from the “Bengalis” who crossed over into the eastern
Rakhine state from Bangladesh.100 Against this backdrop of national existential uncertainty,
Wirathu’s extremism expressed through identity supremacism comes out clearly. The Buddhist
fundamentalist Ma Ba Tha movement of which Wirathu is a part champions the preservation of
Buddhist-Bamar political supremacy—and has significant grassroots support among Myanmar
Buddhists who buy into its narrative that “inherently peaceful and non-proselytising” Buddhism
in the country is “susceptible to oppression by more aggressive faiths” like Islam.101 Wirathu
goes further. He has warned publicly that Muslims have long been “despicable and dangerous
destroyers of our Buddhism and Buddhist symbols” and have a “100-year plan” to take over
Myanmar’s “sovereignty through inter-faith marriages with Buddhists.”102 Deifying Ma Ba Tha
as Buddhism’s divinely sanctioned vanguard in Myanmar, Wirathu has quipped, “We came
down from the sky, not like a normal person,” and “we are brilliant people.”103
The identity supremacism of Wirathu and other similar Buddhist extremists reflects the
second and third core extremist characteristics described earlier: acute in-group bias and outgroup prejudice. Wirathu’s fellow Ma Ba Tha monk U Parmoukkha hinted at what he considers
the innate “good essence” of the Buddhist in-group in Myanmar when he declared that “in
Buddhist teaching it is taught that you cannot harm other people”; hence, “the person who harms
is not someone who follows Buddhist teaching.” And though he claimed that he did not know
“whether the people who say they are Buddhist and then attack only temporarily follow
Buddhism or whether they follow it at all,” he confidently asserted that if “there is no Buddhism,
there will be more violence, and the situation will be even worse.” Parmoukkha added that “all
the robbery, all the killings are seen as bad deeds.” Thus, without the Buddhist in-group, “ideas
might come about that these acts are not sinful,” because “there would be no one to teach that
they are bad.”104 In contrast, Parmoukkha’s anti-Muslim prejudice and assumption that Muslims
possess a “bad essence” was revealed in his assertion that “Muslims have been trained since they
are young in the mosque” about “extreme ideas,” such as a call “to dominate the whole world.
“Most of the Muslims,” he asserts, “are touched in this way.”105 Evidence for the worrying
mainstreaming of the extremist notions put forth by Wirathu, Parmoukkha, and their ilk that
Muslims in Myanmar—including Muslims of shared Bamar ethnicity even—are basically
homogeneously evil is revealed by a young Buddhist who informed the journalist Francis Wade
that though he once had a Rohingya friend, he “no longer interacted with Muslims” because
“they are very stupid” and their “religion is bad,” and though he did not think his former
Rohingya friend was necessarily a “bad person,” “his ethnicity is bad,” and the “group is bad.”106
Buddhist extremism in Myanmar also reflects the fourth core characteristic of the extremist
in its obsession with purity and fear of contamination through intimate contact with the Muslim
out-group. The belief in the importance of maintaining Buddhist-Bamar in-group purity against
supposed Muslim bad essence is buttressed by behaviors and bans targeting Muslims. 107
Wirathu, for example, in a December 2012 sermon in Meikhtila, several months before violence
broke out there, “called on Buddhists to disassociate themselves entirely from Muslims,” in the
process “solidifying the religious divide and making it clear that they were two very different
groups of people, one to be trusted, the other not.”108 Putting such bans into operation included,
in Wirathu’s view, buying only from Buddhist-owned businesses, because patronizing Muslims
stores would strengthen their economic and political capacity to “destroy the whole nation and
religion,” and they “will take over the whole country.” At the same time, Wirathu advised
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Buddhists to identify Buddhist stores by a familiar badge, the “969” sticker associated with the
Buddhist fundamentalist movement of which he was a part. Several months, later, during the
Meikhtila violence, Buddhist mobs scrawled another badge—the “786” associated with Islam—
on Muslim houses marked out for attack.109 While reciprocal radicalization of Buddhist-Muslim
dyads in the country leading up to and in the wake of communal violence meant that often
religiously mixed communities suddenly became polarized and physically segregated, there were
some villages—such as the one in central Myanmar Parmoukkha hailed from—“where only
Buddhists live and where we didn’t know much about other religions.” Parmoukkha’s growing
up in such an insulated enclave would have helped incubate his insular, fundamentalist-extremist
fixation with preserving in-group purity against the existential Muslim threat.110
Wirathu and his fellow Ma Ba Tha extremists seem to possess pronounced dualistic thinking
twinned with low integrative complexity, a reflection of the fifth characteristic of the extremist.
Wirathu seeks to “eliminate the middle ground, to split, dividing the world into safe and threat,
good and evil, life and death.”111 As he puts it, 90 percent of Muslims in the country are “radical,
bad people” who are “stealing our women [and], raping them” and who seek to “occupy our
country,” extinguishing Buddhism in the process.112 Wirathu’s narrative—disseminated widely
through CDs and DVDs—was, mildly put, simplistic. As Wade observes, Wirathu’s storyline of
the existential Muslim threat “linked together in a simple chain of causation the fate of
Buddhism to the fate of the nation, and thus the fate of the individual,” and if not checked,
“events happening elsewhere in the country would soon come to bear on the security of people
hundreds of miles away.”113 Wirathu taught that “in Buddhism, we are not allowed to go on the
offensive”; but “we have every right to protect and defend our community” if attacked.114 While
the narrative was straightforward and unsophisticated, it was potent, capable of spreading
visceral fear of and hate toward Muslims from “Rakhine State to towns in the country’s centre,”
radicalizing communities and “transforming neighbours into enemies.”115
The sixth core characteristic of the religious extremist—dangerous speech capable of
catalyzing out-group violence—is also readily evinced among Myanmar’s Buddhist extremists.
Wirathu and other influential extremists adroitly exploit long-standing anti-Muslim prejudices,
and state authorities seem unable and unwilling to decisively curb their efforts to dominate the
information space with their simple but virulent narrative.116 Wirathur in particular employs a
key element of dangerous speech—linguistic dehumanization. Perhaps the mildest term he has
used to dehumanize Muslims is kalar, a derogatory word similar to the “N-word” in a US
context. 117 He has been more extreme, declaring, for example, “Muslims are only well behaved
when they are weak” and adding that when “they are strong they are like a wolf or a jackal, in
large packs they hunt down other animals.”118 Like the Nazis in World War II who reframed the
Jews as “leeches” and “bloodsuckers,” Wirathu describes Muslims, including even those of the
same Bamar ethnicity, in similar terms.119 Wirathu has also described Muslims as “mad dogs,”120
“cannibals,” and even “African carp”—a “very violent,” “invasive species” that “breed quickly”
and that “eat each other and destroy nature.”121
All the preceding examples are indicative of Wirathu’s use of dangerous speech in the soft
mode, in which no explicit call to violent action against Muslims is made. Wirathu often
emphasizes that “he never encouraged attacks, and nowhere in his sermons does he implore
followers to take up the sword”—but as Wade points out, he certainly “did lay down tinder that
could easily catch flame.”122 Moreover, according to the US-based human rights group Justice
Trust, “outbreaks of violence often coincide with Wirathu’s speeches or posts on the 969
Facebook page.”123 Wirathu, however, has not been averse to switching to the hard mode on
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occasion, actively inciting out-group violence, such as when he urged Buddhist mobs to “cut off
the d*cks” of Muslim men “to make an example of Muslim men who marry our women.”124
Wirathu, therefore, seems to exemplify what Schmid, as noted, calls a “not-violent” extremist—
or, simply, an extremist—whose position on nonviolent action is based on tactical considerations
rather than pious principle.125 Thus, when Wirathu assures journalists that he is “going to give
lessons to educate the whole people to stop the violence”126 and implores them, “Look at my
face, I don’t have any hatred at all,”127 it behooves one not to be too readily taken in.
The seventh core characteristic of the religious extremist—his drive to seek political power
to restructure the wider polity in line with his vision of a religiously legitimated sociopolitical
order—is evidenced in Wirathu’s and Ma Ba Tha’s vocal support for four laws enacted by the
government in May and August 2015 that, taken together, appear to represent institutionalized
discrimination against Muslims.128 The Population Control Law appears to give the government
the necessary powers to implement noncoercive population control measures in areas identified
as having high population density and growth and high maternal and child mortality exacerbated
by poverty and food scarcity. Observers have pointed out that this law appears to “apply
particularly to Muslim-majority northern Rakhine state where coercive local orders that limited
Muslim couples to two children have been in place in the past.” The Buddhist Women’s Special
Marriage Law puts several administrative strictures in place to regulate “any marriage of a
Buddhist woman to a non-Buddhist man.” It requires that a “non-Buddhist man must allow the
wife to freely follow her Buddhist faith, not attempt to convert her and allow any children to
freely follow the religion of their choice”—and most pointedly, the law requires that he “must
not insult Buddhism in any way,” or else he is liable “to three years imprisonment or a fine.” The
Religious Conversion Law imposes regulations on Buddhists seeking to convert to other
religions; a township Religious Conversion Scrutinising and Registration Board must examine
each case and approve such decisions. Finally, the Monogamy Law makes it a criminal offense,
among other things, “to have more than one spouse”; offenders are liable to “up to seven years
imprisonment.”129 Such laws are extremist in the sense that they diverge from “Myanmar’s
constitutional provisions on religious freedom and non-discrimination” and “its treaty
obligations under various international human rights conventions.” Because these laws appear to
“have discriminatory intent and to be targeted at Muslims,” 130 they represent a form of
Galtungian structural violence directed at Muslims, preventing them from actualizing their
religious and lifestyle preferences and potentials.

Conclusion
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), on January 23, 2020, delivered a preliminary ruling on a
widely reported case brought by Gambia against Myanmar for its alleged “genocide” against the
Rohingya Muslims—a case that has generated global attention. The ICJ “recognized the extreme
vulnerability of the Rohingya in Myanmar and the irreparable harm they have suffered” and
called on Myanmar to take steps to curtail its structural violence against the embattled minority
group. In particular, Myanmar is required “to take all measures within its power” to “prevent
killing members of the group” and to avoid “causing serious bodily or mental harm to the
members of the group,” “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part,” or “imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group.”131 Legal experts believe that it is going to very difficult for the ICJ to
bring a genocide verdict against Myanmar, prompting some to argue that Gambia should have
pursued the lesser and supposedly more winnable charges of “war crimes” or “ethnic cleansing.”
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While there are still several months of deliberations and assessment of further evidence to come,
some observers note that within Myanmar itself, by “taking on the allegations of the ICJ case in
a most direct and defiant manner,” the Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi has effectively
“reemerged as the protector of the Burmese people, the nation and indeed the Myanmar
military.” Her actions have won her domestic political capital that can strengthen her hand in her
ongoing political tussle with the military over “democratic reform, constitutional revision and the
fight to bring the military back under civilian control,” and most analysts assess that her NLD
party can win the coming national elections slated for later in 2020, albeit with a “smaller
margin.”132 It is hoped that Suu Kyi will, in the process of consolidating her power further, reexamine ways to curb Buddhist extremism against her Rohingya and the wider Muslim minority.
Apart from the obvious and very pressing humanitarian rationale, such an exercise would have
implications for regional security as well. Counterterrorism officials in Malaysia and Indonesia
have long worried that the plight of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar may serve as a lightning
rod, prompting the likes of the Islamic State and Al Qaeda to stoke an even bigger regional
conflagration. Such fears were realized in August 2017. Following attacks by radicalized
Rohingya militants of the shadowy Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army on security forces that
month, the Myanmar state reacted with a massive crackdown in the western Arakan region,
killing 400 Rohingya and causing 370,000 others to flee to neighboring Bangladesh. The
following month, Al Qaeda called on “mujahid brothers in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and the
Philippines to set out for Burma (Myanmar) to help their Muslim brothers” with a view to
resisting Myanmar state “oppression against their Muslim brothers and to secure their rights,
which will only be returned to them by use of force.”133
As a first step to forestall such a troubling scenario, policy makers within and outside
Myanmar must acquire a much deeper understanding of Buddhist extremism, recognizing that,
like all religious extremisms, Buddhist extremism is an acute fundamentalist belief system
justifying structural violence against out-groups. Only then will a more holistic attempt at
ameliorating the serious humanitarian and wider, looming geopolitical aspects of the ongoing
Rohingya crisis be possible.
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